The question is Case 3000
ends in ditches
It's interesting, but that's not the most significant thing about this issue. When it comes to suspicion of any kind of wrongdoing, the question is fair if it has crossed the line and is considering a crime. This is naturally the bread and butter of police researchers and the prosecution. However, the issues raised by the submarine issue are a completely different issue, just as important: The way decisions have been made of far-reaching security outcomes.
There are at least six issues at hand. The first is concerned about whether the Germans were aware that Israel was interested in acquiring three additional submarines, for a total of nine, but that the decision was changed only because of opposition by the defense minister Moshe Ya & # 39 ; Alon only decided that the three additional submarines would replace three older submarines.
Nine submarines are well beyond need and can be maintained. So how did such a purpose come about it?
The second issue is why such a decision should be made as early as years before the existing submarines become obsolete? How the cabinet approves the army's multi-year plan, the Gideon program, and soon comes to a decision of this type, above and beyond that framework.
The third issue is about the defense minister's claim that the prime minister, without his knowledge, has asked Germany to buy two ships and found finding a submarine ship. This is similar to the prime minister's request to buy another F-15 squadron of the United States without knowing about the defense minister, the main staff and the head of the air force.
In terms of these three issues, it is worth emphasizing that the purpose of a multi-year plan for the defense organization is to maximize the certainty of a specific budget. It is possible and necessary to argue about the best possible balance, but it is unreasonable to make intermittent decisions without understanding the full alternative price, and it is impossible to determine and certainly not convey this to another country, before maintaining a deep depth of internal debate among Israeli decision makers.
The fourth issue is more difficult: cancel the tender to buy ships to protect Israel's equestrian economic zone and the unilateral decision to buy these ships from Thyssenkrup, which, unlike & In the submarine, it does not have a clear advantage in this area.
Ultimately, large (and more expensive) vessels were purchased, more than need in the first place. Indeed, there are situations where it is better not to hold a tender and hold a transaction between two states (for example the GTG transaction), but in such cases the other state also commits to Buy similar value tools from Israel. That's not what happened here, and it is clear that unusual pressures are applied, which led to the confusing decision.
The fifth issue is about an unusual application by the German company for the Histadrut Trade Union that the ship excavations are privatized. Given that the shipyard is owned by the IDF, it is very unusual, to say the least, for the purchase of property transactions to take behind the landlord's back. Who was aware and who worked with this?
The sixth issue, and the most troubled, is the claim that the Israeli official told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Israel had no resistance to Germany selling higher submarine ships Egypt without knowing about the defense minister.
In fact, there may be no criminal aspect for any of these issues, but should these issues be just looked through the criminal prism? Does the police have the necessary data, experience and motivation to explore this?
These are issues that relate to two completely different areas: foreign policy and security, and the way the Israeli government operates, including the boundaries of responsibility between the different parties.
Without serious severity of criminal suspicions, it seems that the most important issues are those that are reviewed in Case 3000 – military strategic procurement and issues of decision-making – the less interest they are & # 39; n raised it.